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Abstract
Research in psychology about reasoning has often been restricted to relatively inexpressive
statements involving quantifiers (e.g., syllogisms). This is limited to situations that typically do
not arise in practical settings, like ontology engineering. In order to provide an analysis of
inference, we focus on reasoning tasks presented in external graphic representations where
statements correspond to those involving multiple quantifiers and unary and binary relations. Our
experiment measured participants’ performance when reasoning with two notations. The first
notation used topological constraints to convey information via node-link diagrams (i.e., graphs).
The second used topological and spatial constraints to convey information (Euler diagrams with
additional graph-like syntax). We found that topological-spatial representations were more
effective for inferences than topological representations alone. Reasoning with statements
involving multiple quantifiers was harder than reasoning with single quantifiers in topological
representations, but not in topological-spatial representations. These findings are compared to
those in sentential reasoning tasks.
Keywords: inference, diagrammatic reasoning, external representation, quantifiers, binary
predicates
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Human inference beyond syllogisms: an approach using external graphical representations
Introduction
In the literature on psychology of reasoning, categorical syllogisms, for example, All B are
A; some B are C; therefore some C are A, have been intensively studied (for a survey, see
Khemlani & Johnson-Laird 2012). However, it may not be true that categorical syllogisms are
frequently used in our daily life. Non-syllogistic forms of reasoning have attracted particular
attention in the study presented in this paper, which encompasses the expressive case of binary
verbs (requiring two terms) and multiple quantifiers, such as All koalas eat only eucalyptuses.
This is achieved through external graphical representations where quantification is implicit in the
formed statements; examples will be given later.
Some cognitive studies have already explored frameworks that are beyond the traditional
ones of categorical syllogisms. Johnson-Laird, Byrne, and Tabossi (1989) dealt with syllogisms
involving verbs, for example, from the premises All A are in the same place as some B; All B are
in the same place as all C to the conclusion All A are in the same place as all C. However, the
verbs are restricted to spatial binary ones with transitivity or symmetry. A similar restriction was
applied to the recent study of Ragni and Sonntag (2012). These studies adopt an approach from
the viewpoint of mental model theory, and propose that mental representations for multiply
quantified sentences consist simply of alphabets or dots with different shapes representing
individuals. However, such simple representations, by way of only using spatial verbs, do not
represent all cases that use binary verbs.
Geurts and van der Slik (2005) used mixed forms of syllogisms with single and double
quantifiers; for example,Most A played against more than two B and All B were C impliesMost A
played against more than two C. They demonstrated the effect of monotonicity profiles of
quantifiers, rather than specific mental representations and processes. In addition, non-standard
quantifiers, for example, cardinal (numerical) quantifiers such as more than three (Kroger et al.,
2008), proper nouns such as a is an A (“a” is an individual constant) (Politzer & Mercier, 2008;
Khemlani, Lotstein & Johnson-Laird, 2014), and proportional quantifiers such as most and few
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(Ragni, Singmann, & Steinlein, 2014; Sato & Mineshima, 2016) have been also explored.
However, the scope of the studies was still restricted to the syllogistic form consisting of minor,
major, and middle terms.1 Furthermore, each extended case was explored separately and there
have been few comparisons between single quantifiers and multiple quantifiers.
By contrast, recent developments in ontology engineering shed new light on natural
language inferences, contributing to the expanding coverage of psychological reasoning tasks.
Nguyen et al. (2012) collected deduction patterns (inference tasks), and demonstrated their
prevalence of a wide variety of forms of reasoning with quantifiers and unary and binary
relations. Using novice participants, performance using the deduction patterns as inference tasks
was evaluated. It was found that there was a difficulty gap between reasoning with single
quantifiers and reasoning with multiple quantifiers, with 76.4% accuracy for (statements
involving) single quantifiers and 59.0% for multiple quantifiers. This leads to two important
questions. What makes reasoning with multiple quantifiers hard? What kind of cognitive
processes of reasoning do people employ in the presence of quantifiers?
A main concern of these questions is inference tasks, which are distinguished from
interpretations, but inference necessarily follows the process of interpreting premises. So it is
important for the interpretation to be fixed in some way when exploring the nature of human
inferences. Indeed, Stenning and van Lambalgen (2001) emphasised the distinction of two kinds
of reasoning: reasoning toward an interpretation of premises and reasoning from a fixed
interpretation of premises.2 Based on the approach of using easy-to-understand representations
(Sato & Mineshima, 2015; Sato, Sugimoto, & Ueda, 2018), the current study adapts external
graphical representations, instead of ordinary representations of natural language sentences, to fix
the interpretation of premises and provide a fine-grained analysis of inference. In particular, we
focus on two distinct graphical representations. The first exploits topology to convey information
1Middle terms appear in both major premises (containing major terms) and minor premises (containing minor
terms), and minor and major terms compose conclusions.
2In addition, Stenning and van Lambalgen clearly stated that “If the interpretation is not fixed, what is one actually
testing? (p.291)”.
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via node-link diagrams (i.e., graphs), hereinafter called a topological representation. The second
exploits topological and spatial constraints to convey information (Euler diagrams with additional
graph-like syntax), hereinafter called a topo-spatial representation. Importantly, both types of
representation convey information that is semantically rich. They give rise to statements involving
either single quantifiers (and unary relations) or involving multiple quantifiers along with binary
relations.
In this paper, we explore the cognitive processes involved in graphical inferences about
semantically rich statements containing multiply quantified information. Of course, the findings
apply to the cases covered by the particular representations used in the study. However, they lead
us to a more general point. Even when people interpret statements of sentences in usual sentential
reasoning tasks, choices must be made about their representations. Thus, the findings in our
experiment, in which particular representations are externally given, can contribute to our
understanding of human inferences in sentential format. This will be explored later in the paper.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present a task analysis of deductive
inference by graphical representations. In Section 3, we report on the experiment which measured
participants’ performance of the tasks. In Section 4, we discuss the findings and implications to
cognitive science of reasoning.
Task analysis
Topological and topo-spatial representations
As mentioned in the Introduction, human reasoning with quantifiers is necessary in a wide
variety of single and multiple quantified forms, in line with the recent development in ontology
engineering. Historically, ontologies were defined using some kind of graphs (e.g., Brachman &
Schmolze, 1985), before the formulations of description logics (Schmidt-Schauß & Smolka,
1991) and web ontology languages (W3C OWL Working Group, 2012).3 As a graph
3As discussed in Stenning (2002, Chap.2), graph (node-link) representations can essentially be the same as senten-
tial representations with respect to expressivity.
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representation for OWL constructs, this study focuses on the Simple Ontology Visualization API:
SOVA4 (Itzik & Reinhartz-Berger, 2014). Note that SOVA graphs are fundamentally composed of
nodes and links but, as full ontology representations, they need a wider variety of nodes and links.
The basic syntactic units of SOVA graphs are given in Fig.1. Nodes with oblique font labels
are used for named classes (i.e., sets), individuals, cardinalities, binary-verbs, etc. In nodes for
binary-verbs, there are two kinds of restrictions: (1) in universal restriction (8:) – subject class op
only object class, where op is a binary verb; (2) in existential restriction (9:) – subject class op at
least one object class. Nodes with normal font labels are used for all things (T), no things (NT),
anonymous classes (A), negation (¬), intersection (\), etc. In addition, various forms of links are
used for two types of relations: set-theoretical ones (e.g., SubclassOf, DisjointClasses,
IntersectionOf) and binary-verb. Fig.2 illustrates examples of basic configurations of SOVA
graphs. Examples with binary verbs of SOVA graphs will be given in Section 2.2. SOVA graphs,
whilst more complex than those in Hartley and Barnden (1997, p.170), are still composed of
topological relationships in nodes and links, giving rise to semantic meanings of expressive
statements involving quantifiers.
As well as topological relations, spatial relations – such as inclusion and exclusion – are
available. We focus on concept diagrams (Stapleton, Compton, & Howse, 2017) as a topo-spatial
representation of ontologies, as shown in Fig.3. The basic idea of concept diagrams is that Euler
diagrams and graphs (nodes and links) are merged; for a similar approach, see Harel (1988) and
Sugiyama and Misue (1991), although those systems are not expressive enough to fully represent
ontologies. Syntactic units constituting concept diagrams are given in Fig.3. Rectangles are used
for all things, named (labelled) curves are used for classes, unnamed curves for anonymous
classes, and shading illustrates the absence of things. Solid arrows with labels are used for
binary-verbs with universal (only) restriction, and dashed arrows with labels are used for
binary-verbs with existential (at least one) restriction. Furthermore, relations are divided into two
types: set-theoretical and binary-verb. Set-theoretical relations (e.g., SubclassOf, DisjointClasses,
4https://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/SOVA (Accessed Dec. 2017)
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IntersectionOf, etc.) are expressed by spatial (inclusion and exclusion) relations of the
corresponding syntactic objects; see Fig.4. Binary-verb relations are expressed by arrows from
source objects to target objects. Examples with binary verbs of concept diagrams will be given in
Section 2.2.
Reasoning with multiple quantifiers in topological and topo-spatial representations
We can make inferences using topological representations of SOVA graphs and using
topo-spatial representations of concept diagrams. In such diagrammatic reasoning tasks, one is
asked to judge whether the diagram transformations from premises to a conclusion are valid.
Here, the premise diagrams are true and they are transformed into the conclusion diagram. If the
conclusion diagram is true, given the information in the premise diagrams, the transformation is
valid. Otherwise the transformation is not valid.
Fig.5 shows examples of tasks in graphical reasoning, which consist of two premises and
one conclusion, and they are divided by a line. In each figure, (a) and (b) are SOVA cases (c) and
(d) are concept diagram cases. Cases (a) and (c) give rise to statements about sets and unary
relations involving single quantifiers, hereinafter called the ‘single quantifier’ case, and are
translated as Everything is a darfellan & No grippli is a darfellan; therefore, nothing is a grippli.
Cases (b) and (d) give rise to the statements about sets and binary relations involving multiple
(double) quantifiers, hereinafter called the ‘multiple quantifier’ case, and are translated as Every
daemonfey is related to at least one thing in both axani and phoera under ‘isGuidedBy’ & No
axani is a phoera; therefore, nothing is a daemonfey.
In graphical or diagrammatic reasoning, it is generally assumed that reasoners merge
premise representations into one, and then judge if a given conclusion representation can be
obtained from the merged representation (cf. Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). Fig.6 illustrates
possible intermediate representations generated by merging premise diagrams in Fig.5. In the
SOVA case of Fig.5(a), one identifies the nodes T and darfellan in the two premise graphs, and
overlays the two linking (double headed and white headed arrows) between these two nodes,
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while preserving the other relations. Consequently, one can produce the merged representation of
Fig.6(a). Here T, referring to all-things, is linked with an equivalent node to darfellan, while T is
also linked by a subclass arrow from grippli (which is disjoint from darfellan). In order for all the
premises and conclusion to be true, it is needed as a conclusion statement that there is no
individual who is a grippli; that is, the set grippli is empty. How do we deduce this from the SOVA
graph in Fig.6(a)? Well, Fig.6(a) explicitly shows that darfellan is equivalent to Thing and is
disjoint from grippli. Therefore, grippli is disjoint from Thing and, so, there can be no grippli
individuals. Thus, one can judge that the conclusion statement corresponding to Nothing is a
grippli, which is expressed in the graph by linking, using a subclass arrow from grippli to NT
(which represents the empty set), is valid. In the concept diagram case of Fig.5(c), Fig.6(c) is
created by identifying the curves of darfellan in the two premise diagrams and merging the
diagrams. Here the information that the region other than darfellan is shaded is added into the
diagram in which the intersection of grippli and darfellan is shaded. As a result, the region inside
of darfellan, but outside of grippli is unshaded. From this merged diagram, we can extract the
conclusion diagram in which the region inside grippli is entirely shaded. Again, we deduce there
can be no grippli individuals. Here we can observe that, in reasoning with single quantifiers,
SOVA graph and concept diagrams are similar in that unary relations are expressed by one basic
configuration: SOVA links two nodes and concept diagrams use spatial relations.
Fig.6(b) is created by identifying the nodes T, axani, and phoera in the two premise
diagrams of Fig.5(b) and merging the diagrams. While daemonfey is linked under a verb to at
least one thing in the intersection between axani and phoera, axani is linked using a disjoint edge
to phoera. In order for all the premises and conclusion to be true, the conclusion statement in
which daemonfey is empty is needed. Thus, one can judge that the conclusion statement
corresponding to Nothing is a daemonfey is valid. Here, understanding the relations between
daemonfey and axani/phoera through a binary verb requires processing multiple arrows among
nodes. Thus, reasoning with multiple quantifiers is expected to require much more cognitive
effort than reasoning with single quantifiers. On the other hand, in concept diagrams, as shown in
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Fig.6(d), binary verbs are expressed by one arrow in which the source and target are directly
specified (since unary relations are expressed by spatial constraints instead of arrows). Thus,
reasoning with multiple quantifiers may not require much more effort than reasoning with single
quantifiers.
In some cases of reasoning with concept diagrams, there might be certain difficulties in
merging premise diagrams. As an example, consider the task shown in Fig.7. Judging from curve
configurations, neither inclusion nor exclusion relations necessarily hold between the (stone and
unlabelled) curves in the first premise and an unlabelled curve in the second premise.5 Judging
from binary verb relations, however, since all things (rectangle) are related to only a class (curve)
under has (in the second premise), one can find that a subclass of things (curve labelled buckawn)
cannot be related to something other than the above class under has. Thus, in either possible
configuration between the stone curve in the first premise and the unlabelled curve in the second
premise, the target region of the arrow ‘has at least four’ is inside the target region of the arrow
‘has at most one’. This expresses that each buckawn has at least four stones and each buckawn
has at most one stone. Accordingly, individuals in such a subject class (buckawn) cannot exist. In
order for all the premises and conclusion to be true, the conclusion statement in which the subject
class buckawn is empty is needed. Thus, one can judge that the conclusion statement
corresponding to Nothing is a buckawn is valid. Cases in which premise diagrams do not uniquely
match when merging them are relatively complex in that the reasoner has to consider more than
5It should be noted that throughout the paper, each class (concept) may denote an empty or non-empty set. Conse-
quently, each minimal region (i.e., a region having no other region contained within it) in a concept diagram also may
denote an empty or a non-empty set. Thus, when the relation between two curves is unknown, they are represented
as two partially overlapping curves. Note that full understanding of diagrammatic semantics with respect to partially
overlapping curves is not required for understanding the cognitive strategy described here. If people find that an in-
clusion or exclusion relationship is unspecified to be merged, they can judge the validities of arguments. Indeed, in
Sato, Wajima, and Ueda (2018) who recorded the coordinate values of diagrams as they were moved by reasoners,
it was reported that some reasoners really enumerated multiple possible configurations of inclusion, exclusion, and
overlapping relationships, instead of placing curves as partially overlapping.
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one possibility; we call them ‘non-matching’ cases.6 Solving non-matching cases like Fig.7 could
involve processes requiring more cognitive effort than ‘matching’ cases like Fig.5(c-d). In
reasoning with topological representations of SOVA, there is no such classification in merging
premise representations.
Based on our analysis, we have the following five hypotheses. (1) In reasoning with single
quantifiers, there is no significant difference between the two representations. (2) Topo-spatial
representations are more effective than topological representations in reasoning with multiple
quantifiers. (3) In topological representations, reasoning with multiple quantifiers is harder than
reasoning with single quantifiers. (4) In topo-spatial representations, there is no significant
difference between single and multiple quantifiers. (5) In topo-spatial representations, reasoning
in the non-matching cases is harder than reasoning in the matching cases.7
Experiment
In order to test the above five hypotheses, we conducted an experiment measuring
participants’ performances when making inferences with topological representations and
topo-spatial representations. Before the inference tasks, the participants were given instructions
on the (informal) semantics of representations and then their comprehensions were checked by a
pretest (for details, see below). Given the experimental settings, it is assumed in our framework
that the tasks for participants involve not just syntactic transformations of the pieces of some
plane figure puzzle, but a kind of diagrammatic inference, in which the entailment from premise
6This kind of difficulty in premise integration can also arise in reasoning with Euler diagrams in cases of syllogisms
having an existential premise (e.g., All B are A; some C are B. Therefore, some C are A); see Sato and Mineshima
(2015).
7In statistical hypothesis testing, the null hypotheses corresponding to the above predictions are that there is no
significant difference between the two conditions. While the predictions of (2), (3), and (5) indicate that the null
hypotheses are expected to be rejected, the predictions of (1) and (4) indicate that the null hypotheses are not expected
to be rejected. Of course, there is no rigorous method of validating that no statistically significant difference (effect)
exists. However, should we find no significant difference then this, at the very least, supports our predictions (1) and
(4) and, thus, allows us to discuss the nature of human inference in question here.
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to a conclusion is judged using both syntactic and semantic information of diagrammatic or
graphical representations.8
Method
Participants. Forty-five undergraduate students from classes on elementary computer
science at the University of Brighton were recruited. The mean age was 22.53 (SD= 5.92) with a
range of 18–48 years. All participants gave informed consent and were paid for their participation
(by way of refreshment voucher). The experiment method was approved by the CEM School
Research Ethics Panel of the University of Brighton. None had any prior training of ontology
engineering or syllogistic logic. One participant gave up on the way, and their data was excluded.
Participants were divided into two groups: the topological group (N = 19) and the topo-spatial
group (N = 25).
Materials. The participants in each group were presented with premise graphs/diagrams
and a conclusion graph/diagram (such as Fig.5). Participants were asked to answer the question of
whether the graph/diagram transformations from premises to conclusion were valid. As shown in
Table 1, we presented 20 items in total, out of which 10 items consisted only of validly
transformed diagrams (#01–10) and 10 items included invalidly transformed diagrams (#11–20).
The 10 valid items were selected from the medium difficulty patterns in Nguyen et al. (2012).
The invalid items were created from the valid ones with minimal changes. Furthermore, the tasks
were divided into singly quantified cases (#01–05/#11–15) and multiply quantified cases
(#06–10/#16–20), and divided into matching cases (#1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 15, 17, 19) and in
non-matching cases (#3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 18, 20). The tasks were presented in one of three
random orders and as a paper-and-pencil test. There was no time limit for completing the tasks,
8This is consistent with the view that diagrammatic reasoning is a kind of surrogated reasoning (Barwise & Shi-
mojima, 1995), in which reasoning about statements having semantic values is partially taken over by operations on
external aids such as diagrams (for various examples of diagrammatic reasoning, see Glasgow, Narayanan & Chan-
drasekaran, 1995). Notions related to surrogation have also been discussed as analogical mapping in Gentner, Holyoak
and Kokinov (2001), Funt (1980), Steels (1990), and Chandrasekaran (2011).
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although the approximate time (30 minutes) for taking the experiment was suggested to the
participants.
Procedures. All participants were collected in a room. First, the participants were
provided with three pages of instructions on the basic meaning of graphs or diagrams, but not on
particular rules to solve inference tasks. Second, a pretest to check whether they understood the
instructions correctly was conducted; they were asked to choose, from a list of three possibilities,
the sentence corresponding to a given graph/diagram, as shown in Fig.8. (the potential difference
of familiarities of representations is reduced since both groups received substantial instruction
and underwent practice trials: cf. Sato & Mineshima, 2015). Third, the participants were
provided with one page of instruction on the meaning of valid transformation (entailment), with
two examples of graphs/diagrams: one is valid (corresponding to All C are B; All B are A;
therefore All C are A) and one is not valid (corresponding to All C are B; All A are B; therefore
All C are A). For the full details of the instruction, see the Appendix. After the instruction phase,
the participants were asked to solve the main reasoning tasks.
Results and Discussion
The data of the participants who made mistakes in more than two items (out of five) of the
pretest were removed. In the following analysis, 3 out of 19 in the topological (SOVA graphs)
group, and 4 out of 25 participants in the topo-spatial (concept diagrams) group were removed.
Figure 9 shows the average accuracy rates of inference tasks in the two groups; for each
task result, see Table 1. The data was subjected to two-way ANOVA for a mixed design (as is
standard, we start by conducting an ANOVA to explore the main effects before we consider our
five predictions.). There was a significant main effect of notation factor (i.e., topological versus
topo-spatial), F = 4.435, p= 0.042. There was a significant main effect of factor involving
quantifiers (i.e, single versus multtiple quantifiers), F = 4.712, p= 0.037. There was no
significant interaction effect, F = 0.426, p= 0.518. So each main effect can be considered
independently, and the following positive effects were found: effect of topo-spatial
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representations (69.1%) compared to topological representations (58.4%), as shown in Figure 9
(above, left); effect of single quantifiers (68.4%) compared to multiple quantifiers (60.5%).
A post-hoc test by Bonferroni’s method was conducted (see Table 2; the data relevant to
prediction 5 is not the target of this ANOVA and a new statistical model is needed.). Regarding
the reasoning with single quantifiers, there was no significant difference between the two
representations: 63.8% for the topological group and 71.9% for the topo-spatial group where
F = 1.834, p= 0.071. This is consistent with our first hypothesis. Regarding the reasoning with
multiple quantifiers, the accuracy rates in the topo-spatial group were significantly higher than
those in the topological group: 53.1% for the topological group and 66.2% for the topo-spatial
group where F = 2.938, p= 0.005. This supports our second hypothesis. In the topological
group, reasoning with multiple quantifiers was significantly harder than reasoning with single
quantifiers where F = 2.849, p= 0.007. This confirms our third hypothesis. In the topo-spatial
group, there was no significant difference between single quantifiers and multiple quantifiers
where F = 1.532, p= 0.134, which is consistent with our fourth hypothesis.
In each comparison between valid items and invalid items, there was no significant
difference at the threshold of 5% in two-tailed t-tests. (i) 58.1% for valid items vs. 58.8% for
invalid items in the topological group (t = 0.085); 71.9 for valid items vs. 66.2% for invalid
items in the topo-spatial group (t = 1.059). (ii) 66.3% for valid items with single quantifiers vs.
61.3% for invalid items with single quantifiers in the topological group (t = 0.516); 79.0% for
valid items with single quantifiers vs. 64.8% for invalid items with single quantifiers in the
topo-spatial group (t = 1.878). (iii) 50.0% for valid items with multiple quantifiers vs. 56.3% for
invalid items with multiple quantifiers in the topological group (t = 0.682); 64.8% for valid
items with multiple quantifiers vs. 67.8% for invalid items with multiple quantifiers in the
topo-spatial group (t = 0.370). This shows that the accuracy performance is not different
between valid and invalid items.
In the topo-spatial group, the averaged data of accuracy rates in the matching cases and in
the non-matching cases were subjected to angular transformation and then t-test. The accuracy
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rates in non-matching cases were significantly lower than those in matching cases: 61.4% for the
non-matching cases and 75.3% for the matching cases (t = 2.748, p= 0.012). This supports our
fifth hypothesis.
General discussion
In summary, our experiment suggests that topo-spatial representations, such as concept
diagrams, can be more effective than topological representations, such as SOVA, in reasoning
tasks containing multiply quantified information. In topological representations, reasoning with
multiple quantifiers is harder than reasoning with single quantifiers. But in topo-spatial
representations, there was no significant difference between these cases. That is, in the
topo-spatial case, the difficulty of the inference task did not increase when richer information was
conveyed in the premises. In topo-spatial representations, furthermore, reasoning in the cases
which require premise diagrams to be merged that contain curves where an inclusion or exclusion
relationship is unspecified (non-matching cases) was harder than in cases where the inclusion or
exclusion relationships were determined (matching cases).
Regarding the performance difference between single and multiple quantifiers, it is noted
that our empirical findings in reasoning with topological representations are similar to those in
sentential reasoning, as reported in Nguyen et al. (2012). Our findings shed light on the fact that
mental representations elicited from sentences contain simple components only rather than hybrid
components (which are an efficient way to represent tasks). Indeed, whether model-like
representations based on linked data points (Johnson-Laird et al., 1989; Ragni & Sonntag, 2012;
Greene, 1992) or syntactic representations corresponding to parsing trees/graphs of sentences
(Braine, 1998), mental representations for expressing multiple quantifiers are assumed to be more
complex than those for single quantifiers. Of course, the complexity can be reduced, for example,
by using additional representations such as set-theoretical and spatial notions, rather than linking
of simple components. However, people not trained in logic and mathematics rarely
spontaneously use such additional representations. Accordingly, Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird
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(1999) pointed out that the use of Euler circles is a sophisticated method provided by school
education, and is not as natural as naive people’s mental representations of quantified assertions
(p.296).
In the broader context of cognitive science on reasoning, can the result that topo-spatial
representations were effective in reasoning with multiple quantifiers provide some more general
implications? The findings of effective expression of tasks can contribute to task naturalisation in
the psychology of reasoning (Politzer, Bosc-Miné & Sander, 2017). If the aim of the current
research is measuring people’s actual logical (not puzzle solving) capability, tasks involving
inference, as opposed to just interpretation, should be set for participants.9 Our experiment
suggests that single quantifiers should be expressed as spatial relations and multiple quantifiers as
topological relations, rather than both types being expressed as topological relations. However,
according to Politzer et al. (2017), natural tasks of categorical syllogism consist of one premise
rather than two premises. This setting is realised by the fact that the existing knowledge of
meaningful terms used in the statements can bridge the gap of an unstated premise. This approach
in inference research is consistent with the recent developments in natural language processing
(Dagan et al., 2009; Bowman et al., 2015) of recognising textual entailment challenge, where
entailment relations between two sentences are calculated. Indeed, it is unclear if such a
framework using a single premise can be applied to the current case of reasoning about more
expressive statements involving quantifiers. However, our findings that there are certain
difficulties in merging multiple premises shed light on the question of whether such a process is
essential in human (logical) inference. We can explore the question by providing an environment
using meaningful content (instead of terms with no implied content used in the current study) in
which the existing knowledge is available and the task complexity can be controlled.
Furthermore, our findings on inference or entailment judgement are in contrast to those of
consistency checking (Sato et al., 2017), where topological representations were more effective
9For example, errors caused by the misinterpretation of premises should be prevented here, as discussed in the
Introduction.
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than topo-spatial representations. Consistency checking is a kind of logical reasoning in which
people are asked to answer the question of whether a diagram makes a contradictory statement.
The contrast between these empirical findings suggests that there are two distinct cognitive
process underlying logical reasoning from external diagrams. One is a pattern matching strategy,
especially based on syntactic forms of representations. While patterns of conclusions entailed
from premises are unlimited (but in the case of syllogisms, there are some restrictions), there are
certain (common) patterns of inconsistency that are exhibited by statements (cf. Flouris et al.,
2006). In the tasks of consistency checking, then, the strategy to syntactically match patterns to
target representations can be reasonable. This strategy is suitable for the notations which are
expressed in a uniform way. Thus, this suggests to us why topological representations were
superior to topo-spatial representations in consistency checking tasks. Another strategy is a more
semantic one, as we now explain. As shown in Fig.5, the conclusion such as Nothing is an A
requires reasoners to generate some new objects which cannot be found only in syntactic
manipulations of representations. Such processes are available only when reasoners correctly
understand semantic meanings of given representations. This semantic process might be suitable
for the topo-spatial representations.
Our findings also provide a suggestion that efficient systems realising human-like
computing, especially interactive theorem proving systems, should be designed in a way to be
sensitive to not only syntactic aspects but also semantic aspects. In addition, in the literature of
ontology information visualisation, graph (topology) based methods have been dominantly used
so far (for a survey, see Ramakrishnan & Vijayan, 2014); by contrast, our findings shed light on
the alternative methods using not only topological but also spatial relations. Indeed, our findings
suggest that there are merits in using topo-spatial notations for representing ontologies, especially
when inferences need to be made.
In this study, we dealt with deductive inference patterns beyond the forms of syllogisms,
but, of course, all of them were not covered. For example, proper nouns such as a is an A (“a” is
an individual constant), as mentioned in the Introduction, were not contained in the corpus of
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deduction patterns in Nguyen et al. (2012). Although their frequencies might not be so high in the
literature of ontology engineering, given the recent findings about fallacies (Mascarenhas &
Koralus, 2017), this line of extension would be interesting in our approach using graphical
representations. Such an extension should be also applied to the cases using non-standard
quantifiers such as proportional quantifiers (e.g., most, few), which are not definable within
first-order logic or OWL 2. In addition, we did not handle relations between verbs, for example,
‘bought’ isInverseOf ‘wasPurchsedBy’, which is a common style of premise in ontology
engineering. Some chains of single deduction patterns, as used in Nguyen et al. (2013), are also
regarded as an applied type of real world reasoning. So these should be analysed next. Through
further extended studies, the nature of human reasoning in general would be explored.
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Appendix: Materials and instructions used in the experiment
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/ard/exp/MateInst3.zip?attredirects=0&d=1
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Fig. 1: Syntactic units constituting of SOVA graphs: (1) classes, (2) individuals, (3)
all things, (4) no things, (5) anonymous classes, (6) natural numbers, (7–9) min-
imum/maximum/exact cardinalities, (10) negation, (11) intersection, (12) union,
(13) binary-verbs, (14) binary-verbs with universal restriction, (15) binary-verbs
with existential restriction, (16) isSubclassOf, (17) DisjointClasses, (18) Equiva-
lentClasses, (19) IntersectionOf in linking \, UnionOf in linking [, ComplementOf
in linking ¬, (20) InstanceOf in linking between class and individual, (21) binary-
verb relation, (22) binary-verb relation with universal restriction and “everything”
in subject term, (23) binary-verb relation with universal restriction and “every-
thing” in object term (concrete words are inserted in nodes with italic font labels).
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Fig. 2: Basic configurations of SOVA graphs: (24) C1 is a subset of C2. (25) C1 is
disjoint from C2. (26) C1 is equivalent to C2. (27) C3 is a subset of the intersection
of C1 and C2. (28) C3 is a subset of the union of C1 and C2. (29) C1 is a subset of
nothing; i.e.,C1 is empty. (30) d is an instance of C1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Fig. 3: Syntactic elements constituting concept diagrams: (1) all things, (2) named
classes, (3) anonymous classes, (4) named individuals, (5) the absence of things,
(6) binary-verbs with universal restriction, (7) binary-verbs with “at least” con-
straints, (8–10) cardinal restrictions which are written on arrows, (11) example of
cardinal restriction: binary-verbs with existential restriction.
(10) (10’) (11) (11’) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Fig. 4: Basic configurations of concept diagrams: (12–12’) C1 is a subset of C2.
(13–13’) C1 is disjoint from C2. (14) C1 is equivalent to C2. (15) C3 is a subset of
the intersection ofC1 andC2. (16)C3 is a subset of the union ofC1 andC2. (17)C1
is empty. (18) d is an instance of C1.
(a) (c)
——————————————————
(b)
——————————————————————————————————–
(d)
Fig. 5: Task examples. Two premises and one conclusion are divided by a line: (a)
topological representations in single quantifier case; (b) topological representations
in multiple quantifier case; (c) topo-spatial representations in single quantifier case;
(d) topo-spatial representations in multiple quantifier case.
(a) (c)
(b)
(d)
Fig. 6: Possible intermediate representations by merging premise diagrams, corre-
sponding to the cases (a)–(d) in Fig.5.
Fig. 7: A task example of ‘non-matching case’ in topo-spatial representations:
premise diagrams do not match in merging them
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q5
Fig. 8: Five pretest tasks in topological group (left) and topo-spatial group (right):
Answer options in Q1–Q3 are 1. All hiateas are robots; 2. No hiateas are robots;
3. None of the above. Correct answers are 1 for Q1; 2 for Q2; 3 for Q3. Answer
options in Q4–Q5 are 1. All hiateas see at least one robot; 2. All hiateas see at
most one robot; 3. All hiateas see exactly one robot. Correct answers are 1 for Q4;
2 for Q5.
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Fig. 9: Average accuracy rates for inference tasks. Error bars represent standard
deviations. * refers to a significant difference at p< 0.05.; ** refers to p< 0.01.
Table 1: Lists of experimental tasks and results of accuracies. Upper rows are
described in a natural language and lower rows are described in description logic.
#01–10 are valid items; #11–20 are invalid items. #01–05/#11–15 are relevant to
single quantifiers only; #06–10/#16–20 are relevant to multiple quantifiers.
No Premises⇒ Conclusion Topo.% TopoSpa.%
01. (Every A is a B) & (no A is a B)⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑ B)∧ (Dis(A,B))⇒ (A⊑⊥) 62.5 80.1
02. (No A is a B) & (everyC is an A) & (every D is a B)⇒ (no C is a D)
(Dis(A,B))∧ (C ⊑ A)∧ (D⊑ B)⇒ (Dis(C,D)) 75.0 85.7
03. (Every A is a (every B is a C)) & (every B is a C)⇒ (every A is a C)
(A⊑ (B⊑C))∧ (B⊑C)⇒ (A⊑C) 87.5 85.7
04. (Everything is a B) & (no A is a B)⇒ (nothing is an A)
(⊤⊑ B)∧ (Dis(A,B))⇒ (A⊑⊥) 56.3 66.7
05. (Every A is a B) & (every A is non-B)⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑ B)∧ (A⊑ ¬ B)⇒ (A⊑⊥) 50.0 76.2
06. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (Everything that something is related to under R is a C)
⇒ (everyC is related to at least one thing in both B and C)
(A⊑ ∃R.B)∧ (Rang(R.,C))⇒ (C ⊑ ∃R.(B⊓C)) 87.5 80.1
07. (Every A is related to at least one thing in both B andC under R) & (no B is a C)⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑ ∃R.(B⊓C))∧ (Dis(B,C))⇒ (A⊑⊥) 25.0 85.7
08. (Every A is related to at least three things in B under R) & (every A is related to at most one B under R)
⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑≥ 3R.B)∧ (A⊑≤ 1R.B)⇒ (A⊑⊥) 43.8 52.4
09. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (every B is nothing)⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑ ∃R.B)∧ (B⊑⊥)⇒ (A⊑⊥) 62.5 57.1
10. (Every A is related to at least four things in B under R) & (each thing is related to at most one thing under R)
⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑≥ 4R.B)∧ (Fun(R.))⇒ (A⊑⊥) 31.3 47.6
11. (Every B is a A) & (no A is a B)⇒ (nothing is an A)
(B⊑ A)∧ (Dis(A,B))⇒ (A⊑⊥) 75.0 71.4
12. (No A is a B) & (everyC is an A) & (every B is a D)⇒ (no C is a D)
(Dis(A,B))∧ (C ⊑ A)∧ (B⊑ D)⇒ (Dis(C,D)) 37.5 52.4
13. (Every A is a (every B is a C)) & (every B is a C)⇒ (every A is a B)
(A⊑ (B⊑C))∧ (B⊑C)⇒ (A⊑ B) 43.8 47.6
14. (Everything is a B) & (every A is a B)⇒ (nothing is an A)
(⊤⊑ B)∧A⊑ B)⇒ (A⊑⊥) 62.5 66.7
15. (Every A is a B) & (every non-B is an A)⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑ B)∧ (¬ B⊑ A)⇒ (A⊑⊥) 87.5 85.7
16. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (Everything that something is related to under R is a C)
⇒ (Everything that something is related to under R is both a C and a non-B)
(A⊑ ∃R.B)∧ (Rang(R.,C))⇒ (Rang(R.,C⊓¬B)) 43.8 38.1
17. (Every A is related to at least one thing in either B,C, or both, under R) & (no B is a C)
⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑ ∃R.(BunionsqC))∧ (Dis(B,C))⇒ (A⊑⊥) 62.5 85.7
18. (Every A is related to at least 1 thing in B under R) & (every A is related to at most three things in B under R)
⇒ (every A is nothing)
(A⊑≥ 1R.B)∧ (A⊑≤ 3R.B)⇒ (A⊑⊥) 56.3 66.7
19. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (every A is nothing)⇒ (nothing is a B)
(A⊑ ∃R.B)∧ (A⊑⊥)⇒ (B⊑⊥) 62.5 66.7
20. (Every A is related to at least one B under R) & (each thing is related to at most one thing under R)
⇒ (nothing is an A)
(A⊑≥ 1R.B)∧ (Fun(R.))⇒ (A⊑⊥) 56.3 81.0
Table
